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Abstract This chapter attempts to shed fresh light on the structural causes of the 
Fukushima accident by illuminating the patterns of behavior of the agents involved 
in a little-known but serious accident that occurred immediately before World War 
II. Despite the expected incalculable damages caused by the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant accident, critical information was restricted to government 
insiders. This state of affairs reminds us of the state of prewar Japanese wartime 
mobilization in which all information was controlled under the name of supreme 
governmental authority. This paper argues that we can take the comparison more 
seriously as far as the patterns of behavior of the agents involved are concerned. 
The key concept that is employed for that argument is the “structural disaster” 
of the science-technology-society interface, the causes of which can be divided 
into two different categories, organizational errors and technological trajectory. 
Through the lens of “structural disaster”, the possibility of functional disintegra-
tion coupled with structural interdependence and secrecy is drawn for investiga-
tion relevant both in wartime and in peacetime. This paper will contextualize the 
sociological implications of the possibility for all of us who face the post-Fukush-
ima situation based on exploration into the hidden prewar accident with particular 
focus on a subtle relationship between success and failure.
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The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident was extremely shocking, 
but what is even more shocking in the eyes of the present writer is the devastating 
failure in transmitting critical information on the accident to the people when the 
Japanese government faced unexpected and serious events after March 11, 2011. 
Secrecy toward outsiders seems to have caused this failure: secrecy to the people 
who were forced to evacuate from their birthplaces, to the people who wanted to 
evacuate their children, to the people who have been suffering from tremendous 
opportunity loss such as giving up entering college, and others. It is virtually 
impossible to enumerate individual instances of suffering and aggregate them in an 
ordinarily calculable manner. Despite such expected incalculable damage, critical 
information was restricted to government insiders. This state of affairs seems to 
show similar tendencies to the state of prewar Japanese mobilization in which all 
information was controlled under the name of supreme governmental authority [1].
One might consider such a comparison to be merely rhetorical. This chapter argues 
that we can take the comparison more seriously as far as the patterns of behavior of 
the agents involved are concerned. It is true that the prewar Japanese military regime 
was oriented toward mobilization for war while the postwar regime has been prohib-
ited from mobilization for war purposes of any kind by the constitution. In this respect 
there is a large discrepancy between the prewar and postwar regimes as to their pur-
pose. However, the surprising but telling similarity of the patterns of behavior embed-
ded in the regimes is evident if we look into the details of a hidden accident that took 
place just before the outbreak of World War II (abbreviated to WWII hereafter).
This chapter attempts to shed fresh light on the structural causes of the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident by illuminating the patterns of behavior of the agents involved in the 
little-known but serious accident involving naval vessels that occurred immediately 
before WWII with a particular focus on the subtle relationship between success and 
failure in the complex science-technology-society interface. The chapter will then 
contextualize the similarity and draw its sociological implications for all of us who 
face the post-Fukushima situation. The conceptual tool that is employed here to that 
end is the “structural disaster” of the science-technology-society interface.
10.2  The “Structural Disaster” of the Science-Technology-
Society Interface
The “structural disaster” of the science-technology-society interface is the concept 
developed to give a sociological account of the repeated occurrence of failures of a 
similar type [2]. In particular, it is developed to clarify a situation where novel and 
undesirable events happen but there is no single agent to blame and no place to allo-
cate responsibility for the events and to prescribe remedies. The reason for denomi-
nating this failure as the failure of the science-technology-society interface rather 
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than that of science, or of technology, or of society is worthy of attention to under-
stand the development of my argument. For example, if nuclear physics is com-
pletely successful in understanding a chain reaction, technology such as nuclear 
engineering could fail in controlling the reaction as in the case of Chernobyl.1 Or if 
nuclear engineering is almost completely successful in containing radioactive mate-
rials within reactors, social decision-making could fail as in the case of Three Mile 
Island (TMI).2 Or if society is completely successful in setting goals for the develop-
ment of renewable energy technologies, science and/or technology could fail as in 
the case of Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC).3
In a word, the success or failure of science, of technology, and of society can-
not be overlapped automatically [9, 10]. In particular, there seems to be something 
missing in-between, which has unique characteristics of its own. The concept of 
“structural disaster” is intended to explore this state. What is in-between could 
be institutional arrangements, organizational routines, tacit interpretations of a 
formal code of ethics, invisible customs, or the networks of interests of different 
organizations. The “structural disaster” consists of one or more of the following 
elements [11]:
1. Adherence to erroneous precedents causes problems to be carried over and 
reproduced.
2. The complexity of a system under consideration and the interdependence of its 
units aggravate problems.
3. The invisible norms of informal groups essentially hollow out formal norms.
4. Quick fixes for problems at hand lead to further such fixes for temporary coun-
ter measures.
5. Secrecy develops across different sectors and blurs the locus of agents responsi-
ble for the problems to be addressed.
This chapter focuses on, among other things, the interdependence of heterogene-
ous agents, which come into play in the science-technology-society interface and 
give rise to secrecy in a specific social condition. This chapter will make clear the 
interdependence by tracing it back to the hidden prewar accident, which will give 
us an important clue to the understanding of the Fukushima Daiichi accident from 
the perspective of “structural disaster” as defined above. To understand the social 
context of this hidden prewar accident, it is necessary to move away from the cur-
rent social condition of the post-Fukushima situation to the prewar wartime mobi-
lization of science and technology, within which the clarification of this hidden 
accident can be properly pursued. After the clarification, we will move back to the 
current situation surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi accident, to present the socio-
logical implications of the hidden accident for the Fukushima Daiichi accident and 
for potential future extreme events.
1
 For a sociological investigation into the relationships between the Chernobyl and Wind scale 
incident, see [3]. For a different view on the relationships, see [4].
2
 For a pioneering sociological investigation into TMI, see [5]. Also see [6, 7].
3
 On a sociological account of an unanticipated social consequence of OTEC, see [8].
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10.3  The Basic Points About the Fukushima Daiichi 
Accident from the Perspective of “Structural 
Disaster”
To elucidate the problem of secrecy in the Fukushima Daiichi accident, several 
basic points can be noted from the perspective of “structural disaster,” which 
should be kept in mind in approaching the hidden accident that happened much 
earlier than the Fukushima Daiichi accident. First, there seems to have arisen a 
repeated occurrence of similar patterns of behavior that have run through var-
ious different instances and in the end have given rise to secrecy. It is true that 
the emergency situation during and after such an extreme event as the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident can provide a good reason to expect confusion and delay in trans-
mitting information. But the degree and range of confusion and delay went far 
beyond those to be expected from an emergency situation alone.
For example, the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose 
Information (abbreviated to SPEEDI hereafter) was developed with the assistance 
of more than ten billion yen to make the early evacuation of the people affected 
smoother and safer. The first recommendation from the Japanese government for 
evacuation was made on March 12. The prediction obtained from SPEEDI was 
made public for the first time on April 26, despite the fact that its prediction had 
been made shortly after the accident. As a result of this secrecy, the affected resi-
dents were advised by the government to evacuate without reliable information at 
the critical initial phase when they were exposed to a high level dose. All they 
could do was to trust the government or not. SPEEDI had been awarded the first 
nuclear history award by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan in 2009 [12], but its 
prediction was never made public when it was needed.
A similar behavior pattern of the government and the resulting secrecy and seri-
ous suffering can be observed in various other cases in the accident, such as the 
delayed venting of the nuclear reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
station, the deregulation for recycling decontaminated mud for concrete produc-
tion, and the rise and fall of dose levels allowed for children in primary school 
and for workers in the station. In light of structural causes implied in the “struc-
tural disaster”, organizational errors seem to have intervened behind this state of 
affairs: TEPCO’s disobedience of the directive by the prime minister, the malfunc-
tion of the so-called “double check” system within Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI), miscommunication between nuclear engineers of the mak-
ers of the reactors and TEPCO officials, and others. If we look into the details 
of the Fukushima Daiichi accident as embodying “structural disaster,” organiza-
tional errors of this kind should be scrutinized, elaborated on, and extended as one 
of the crucial causes of “structural disaster.” This is the first point to be noted in 
approaching the hidden accident that happened much earlier than the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident and in obtaining a broader perspective.
Second, we need to carefully place the specifications of six nuclear reactors at 
the Fukushima Daiichi power station in a technological trajectory, within which 
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we might be able to properly understand what “structural disaster” implies (see 
Table 10.1).
There are two reasons for paying attention to the technological trajectory to under-
stand the Fukushima Daiichi accident as “structural disaster.” First, every reactor 
there had a long history of successful operation extending over 30 years since its start 
in the 1970s, which forces our attention to turn to the possibility of a more “struc-
tural” cause of the accident beyond picking up individual ad hoc troubles and errors. 
Second, as the ratios of domestic production indicate, the reactors at the Fukushima 
Daiichi power station embody the turning point leading from licensed production to 
self-reliant production. For these reasons, there could exist common characteristics 
throughout the reactors in question at the Fukushima Daiichi power station and it is 
possible that such characteristics are somehow related to the “structural disaster” of 
the science-technology-society interface as manifested in the accident.
In a word, the causes of “structural disaster” can be divided into two different 
categories, organizational errors and technological trajectory, as the first step to 
explaining the Fukushima Daiichi accident.4 If we can substantiate these two ele-
ments in understanding other independent cases as “structural disaster,” then we 
will be able to have a stronger position to learn lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident as a “structural disaster” and to extend their implications for potential 
future extreme events. What follows is an independent substantiation of these two 
elements by examining the hidden accident happened long before the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident with a focus on a complex relationship between success and fail-
ure in the science-technology-society interface and secrecy in the interface.
The hidden accident long before the Fukushima Daiichi one is a very 
 perplexing accident of the naval turbine developed by the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, which occurred immediately before the outbreak of WWII. This accident 
enables us to redefine the complex relationship between success and failure in the 
science-technology-society interface both in peacetime and wartime. The accident 
was treated as top secret because of its timing. The suppression of information 
about the accident means that it has not been seriously considered as an event in 
the sociology of science and technology up to now. However, the description and 
4
 On organizational errors in the context of technological failures, see [14–17] regarding the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident. For a pioneering study referring to the dynamic aspect of techno-
logical trajectory in the history of technological change, see [18].
Table 10.1  Specifications of the nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi power station
Source [13]
Reactor unit no. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Type BWR BWR BWR BWR BWR BWR
Container vessel Mark I Mark I Mark I Mark I Mark I Mark II
Output (×104 kW) 46 78.4 78.4 78.4 78.4 110
Makers GE GE/Toshiba Toshiba Hitachi Toshiba GE/Toshiba
Domestics (%) 56 53 91 91 93 63
Year Built 1971 1974 1976 1978 1978 1979
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analysis of this accident will suggest that technological development can depart 
significantly from a unidirectional process. This also implies that we need to revise 
our view of the science-technology-society interface beyond a simplistic dichoto-
mous understanding in terms of success or failure.
The steam turbine was invented, and finally patented in 1884, by British engi-
neer C.A. Parsons, who in 1894 obtained a patent for the marine turbine [19].5 
After Parsons’ original invention, it was supposed that the marine turbine had 
become a reliable, mature technology in the prewar period. The hidden accident of 
the naval turbine that occurred immediately before WWII, however, throws doubt 
on the validity of a unidirectional and one-dimensional view of such a develop-
ment trajectory for technology. To confirm this doubt, it is necessary to outline the 
development trajectory of the Japanese type naval turbine by making clear the 
locus of the complex relationship between success and failure.
10.4  The Development Trajectory of the Kanpon  
Type and Its Pitfalls
The technology taken up here is the Kanpon type turbine, Kanpon being the Technical 
Headquarters of the Navy. The Kanpon type turbine was developed by the Imperial 
Japanese Navy about 1920 to substitute entirely self-reliant technologies for imported 
ones. This naval turbine provides the key to understanding the connection between 
success and failure. The reason is that the Kanpon type was the standard turbine for 
Japanese naval vessels from 1920 to 1945, and as regards its blades a serious but 
almost inexplicable and little-known accident occurred immediately before WWII.6 
The first question to approach the core of the connection between success and failure 
lies in the background against which the Kanpon type turbine was developed.7
From the time of the first adoption of the marine turbine in the early twentieth 
century (1905) after intensive investigations and license contracts, the Imperial 
Japanese Navy accumulated experience in the domestic production of marine tur-
bines. Throughout this process, the Navy carefully monitored the quality of 
British, American, and various other Western type turbines and evaluated them.8 
5
 As for the procession of events before 1884, see [20].
6
 Kanpon is the abbreviation of the Kansei Honbu, which means the Technical Headquarters of 
the Imperial Japanese Navy.
7
 Studies on the innate connection between success and failure of the science-technology-society 
interface have scarcely been undertaken from the sociological point of view. See [21] for a short-
ened version of this chapter.
8
 The British type originated in Parsons and the American type in Curtis turbines, respectively. 
The first demonstration of the Parsons turbine at the Naval Review in 1897 caused a sensation 
[22]. With respect to the Curtis turbine, see [23]. On detailed descriptions and analyses of these 
dual strategies of the Navy outlined here, see [24, pp. 54–63]. As for a more general background 
of the relation between the Navy and private companies, see [24, pp. 74–78].
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As a result, a reduction gearing adopted by the Navy for the first time in 1918 con-
tributed greatly to the total efficiency of the main turbines.
However, quite unexpectedly, the introduction of reduction gearing caused one 
failure after another from 1918 (see Table 10.2).
What was most important to the Navy was the fact that all the geared turbines caus-
ing failures and breakdowns were Western types as shown in Table 10.2. And the 
license contracts with the makers of the two leading turbines, the Curtis and the Parsons 
types, were due to expire in June 1923 and in August 1928, respectively. Considering 
the failures and breakdowns in light of this situation, the Navy started to take official 
steps to develop its own type.9 For the purpose of replacing imported turbines, the new 
Kanpon type turbine was developed, and achieved standardization in design, materials, 
and production method “that is independent of foreign patents” ([26, pp. 133–134]. The 
Kanpon type turbine was also expected to achieve cost reduction and flexible usage for 
a wide range of purposes, which would be made possible by standardization.
Thus the Kanpon type turbine was developed and established as the standard 
turbine for Japanese naval vessels due to the failures and breakdowns of imported 
9
 In February 1921, a turbine conference was organized by the director of the Military Affairs 
Bureau of the Navy to drastically reconsider the design, production method, materials, and oper-
ation method of geared turbines. As a result, the configurations, materials, strength, and instal-
lation of turbine blades were all improved. In addition, in August 1922, the Yokosuka arsenal of 
the Navy undertook an experiment on the critical speed of turbine rotors in accordance with the 
Military Secret No. 1148 directive in order to determine the normal tolerance of turbine rotors in 
terms of revolutions per minute. The above descriptions are based on [26, 27].
Table 10.2  Synopsis of geared turbine failures of naval vessels from 1918
Source [25, 26]. The same naval vessels and naval vessels of the same class suffered similar fail-
ures and breakdowns many times. These repeat failures and breakdowns are omitted here. The sec-
ondary failures and breakdowns caused by the initial ones are also omitted altogether. Gihon in the 
table is the multiple-flow turbine designed by the predecessor of the Technical Headquarters of the 
Navy. Geared turbines made possible an increase of one order of magnitude in revolutions per min-
ute, from 100–200 to 1,000–2,000, which might have affected turbines designed for 100–200 rpm.
Date Ship name Ship type Specification Turbine type
3 Oct 1918 Tanikaze Destroyer Blade fell out Brown-Curtis
30 Nov 1918 Minekaze Destroyer All blades fell out Brown-Curtis (HP)
Parsons (LP)
26 Feb 1919 Sawakaze Destroyer Blade sheared and dropped off Brown-Curtis (HP)
30 Apr 1919 Tenryu Cruiser Blade sheared Brown-Curtis
21 Nov 1919 Tatsuta Cruiser Blade smashed Brown-Curtis
6 Feb 1920 Nire Destroyer Blade sheared Brown-Curtis (HP)
Parsons (LP)
Apr 1920 Kawakaze Destroyer Blade sheared Brown-Curtis
28 Sep 1920 Shimakaze Destroyer Blade breakage Brown-Curtis (HP)
Parsons (LP)
20 Dec 1920 Kuma Cruiser Blade breakage Gihon
18 Mar 1922 Sumire Destroyer Blade damaged Zölly
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Fig. 10.1  Plane view of the first Kanpon type turbine (Source [28])
turbines experienced by the Navy. The first Kanpon type turbine was installed in 
destroyers built in 1924 (see Fig. 10.1).10
All Japanese naval vessels continued to adopt this Kanpon type turbine until 
1945. Everyone regarded it as a landmark that showed the beginning of adoption 
of self-reliant technologies. This is because, as the Shipbuilding Society of Japan 
wrote in its official history of naval architecture and marine engineering, “there 
10
 For the detail of this first Kanpon type turbine, see [24], Chap. 3. Also see [28].
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had been no serious trouble with the turbine for more than ten years since the early 
1920s, and the Navy continued to have strong confidence in their reliability.” [29, 
Vol. 1, p. 668].
What follows is an important counterargument to this account, by calling atten-
tion to the missing failure linking success and failure, a pitfall inherent in the tra-
jectory. The detailed description and analysis of the hidden but serious incident of 
the established Kanpon type turbine that occurred immediately before WWII will 
show how important and meaningful this pitfall is for the trajectory of Japan’s 
technological development, its organizational errors, and its science-technology-
society interface. This is particularly because, as will be clarified below, the pitfall 
was profoundly related to the functional disintegration of the military-industrial-
university complex caused by an unbalanced secrecy, one of the key factors lead-
ing to “structural disaster.” The military-industrial-university complex hereafter 
means an institutional structure made up of the governmental sector, particularly 
the military, the private industrial sector, and universities—mutually autonomous 
in their behavior but in combination expected to contribute to national goals.11
10.5  The Accident Kept Secret
In December 1937, a newly built destroyer encountered an unexpected turbine 
blade breakage accident. Since the accident involved the engine of standard 
design, it caused great alarm. A special examination committee was set up in 
January 1938 to investigate the accident. The committee was called Rinkicho- in 
Japanese. This chapter will refer to the accident as the Rinkicho- accident hereafter. 
Today, there are five non in-house books containing references to the Rinkicho- 
accident. The first reference to the accident appeared in 1952, and the last in 
1981.12 The publication dates and the authors/editors of the references are all 
11
 See [24, p. 50]. There is no implication herewith that the complex was designed in Japan by 
the “rich nation, strong army” policy in a top-down manner. Rather the complex in Japan had an 
endogenous origin. See [24], Chap. 3. As for the “rich nation, string army” policy, see [30]. The 
endogenous origin of the complex might also be detected in Britain as shown by the connection 
between physics and engineering in the life of Lord Kelvin. See [31]. For a study on the complex 
with reference to American science and technology, see [32].
12
 In 1952, seven years after WWII ended, the first reference appeared in [33] compiled under the 
leadership of Michizo- Sendo- who was an engineering Rear Admiral of the Navy. Four years later, 
the second reference appeared in [34] written by Masanori Ito- who was a Mainichi newspaper 
reporter and was also a graduate of the Naval Academy. The third reference [35] that appeared 
in 1969 gives the most authentic history of the failure among the five books. Eight years later, in 
1977, the fourth reference appeared in [29]. The editor-in-chief was a former engineering officer 
of the Navy, and the editorial committee of the society also included several other engineering 
officers of the Navy. Of the five books, this reference provides the most detailed description of the 
technical aspects of the failure, which will be examined below based on newly discovered primary 
source materials. In 1981, the last reference [36] appeared in Kaigun (The Navy) compiled by the 
Institute for the Compilation of Historical Records relating to the Imperial Japanese Navy.
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 different, but all were written by parties connected with the Imperial Japanese 
Navy (see Table 10.3).
The accounts given in these references agree for the most part on their main 
points that the cause was soon identified, resulting in no serious consequence. 
These references make up a kind of success story. And it is extremely difficult to 
look into further details of the failure because little evidence is provided to prove 
what is stated by these references. It appears that the accident was kept secret 
because it occurred during wartime mobilization.
To confirm this, an examination of government documents from around the 
time of the accident is in order. The government documents consulted here are 
the minutes of Imperial Diet sessions regarding the Navy. The minutes of the 
57th Imperial Diet session (held in January 1930) to the 75th Imperial Diet ses-
sion (held in March 1940) contain no less than 7,000 pages about Navy-related 
discussions. These discussions include ten naval vessel incidents summarized in 
Table 10.4.
It is noteworthy in these discussions that the Fourth Squadron incident of 
September 1935, one of the most serious incidents in the history of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy, was made public and discussed in the Imperial Diet sessions 
within a year (on May 18, 1936).13 The Rinkicho- accident occurred on December 
29, 1937, and was handed down informally within the Navy and counted as a 
major incident on a par with the Fourth Squadron incident.14
However, more than two years after the Rinkicho- accident there is no sign in 
the documents that it was made public and discussed in Imperial Diet sessions. As 
will be noted in detail, reports on the accident had already been submitted during 
the period from March to November 1938 (the final report was submitted on 
November 2). Nevertheless the Imperial Diet heard nothing about the accident or 
any detail of measures taken to deal with it. The Rinkicho- accident was so serious 
that it would have influenced the decision on whether to go to war with the U.S. 
13
 The Tomozuru incident of March 11, 1934 was the first major one for the Imperial Japanese 
Navy. Only one year and a half after this, a more serious incident occurred on September 26, 
1935—the Fourth Squadron incident.
14
 Based on interviews by the present writer with Dr. Seikan Ishigai (on September 4, 1987; 
June 2, 1993) and with Dr. Yasuo Takeda (on September 25, 1996; March 19, 1997).




1952 Former engineering rear admiral of the navy
1956 Mainichi newspaper reporter (Graduate of the Naval Academy)
1969 War history unit of the national defense college of the defense agency
1977 Japan shipbuilding society (editor-in-chief and several members of the 
Editorial committee were former technical officers of the navy)
1981 Institute for historical record compilation on the navy



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and Britain. The Fourth Squadron incident was also serious enough to influence 
the decision in that it dramatically disclosed the inadequate strength and stability 
of the hull of the standard naval vessels designed after the London naval disarma-
ment treaty concluded in 1930.15 But it was made public and discussed in Imperial 
Diet sessions. In this respect, there is a marked difference between the handling of 
the two incidents. Regarding the Fourth Squadron incident, the Director of the 
Naval Accounting Bureau, Harukazu Murakami, was forced to give an answer to a 
question by Kanjiro- Fukuda (Democratic Party) at the 69th Imperial Diet session 
held on May 18, 1936.16
Although his answer gave no information regarding the damage to human 
resources (all members of the crew confined within the bows of the destroyers 
died), it accurately stated the facts of the incident and the material damage 
incurred, which amounted to 2.8 million yen in total. Even the damage due to the 
collision between cruisers about five years earlier in Table 10.4 was only 
180,000 yen. The answer from a naval official clearly attested that the Fourth 
Squadron incident was so extraordinarily serious as to oblige him to disclose this 
fact to the public.17 It should be noted here that remedial measures for the problem 
of the turbines of all naval vessels disclosed by the Rinkicho- accident were 
expected to cost 40 million yen [38].
Nevertheless, no detailed open report of the Rinkicho- accident was pre-
sented at the Imperial Diet. This fact strongly indicates that the Rinkicho- 
accident was top secret information, which was not allowed to go beyond 
the Imperial Japanese Navy. What, then, were the facts? This question will 
be answered based on documents owned by Ryu¯taro- Shibuya who was an 
Engineering Vice Admiral of the Navy and was responsible for the turbine 
design of naval vessels at the time (these documents will be called the Shibuya 
archives hereafter).
15
 The purpose of this treaty was to restrict the total displacement of all types of auxiliary war-
ships other than battleships and battle cruisers, while that of the Washington naval disarma-
ment treaty of 1922 was to restrict the total displacement of battleships and battle cruisers. This 
London treaty obliged the Imperial Japanese Navy to produce a new idea in hull design enabling 
heavy weapons to be installed within a small hull, which, however, proved to be achieved at the 
expense of the strength and stability of the hull, as the incident dramatically showed.
16
 “When the Fourth Squadron was conducting maneuvers in the sea area to the east of Japan, 
they encountered a furious typhoon. They were attacked by very rare high waves. Two destroy-
ers were tossed about tremendously. As a result, their bows were damaged. The damage to the 
engines and armament was considerable—two million yen for the ship and 800,000 ¥ for its 
armament, a total of 2.8 million yen” [37, p. 86].
17
 The damage due to the collision between the cruisers Abukuma and Kitakami in terms of con-
temporary currency is based on the above-mentioned answer by the Navy minister Kiyotane Abo 
to a question by Viscount Tanetada Tachibana made on March 2, 1931 during the 59th Imperial 
Diet Session [37, p. 831].
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10.6  The Hidden Accident and the Outbreak of War with 
the U.S. and Britain: How Did Japan Deal with the 
Problem?
The Shibuya archives are enormous, consisting of more than 4,000 materials on 
various subjects including casualties of the atomic bomb.18 Even though we chose 
only the materials directly concerning the Rinkicho- accident, it is impossible to 
present here a full analysis of all the details gleaned from these voluminous mate-
rials. Among these, this chapter focuses on the special examination committee 
established in January 1938. The purpose of the committee was as follows [39]:
Problems were found with the turbines of Asashio-class destroyers…. It is necessary to 
work out remedial measures and study the design of the machinery involved and other 
related matters, so that such studies will help improvements. These research activities 
must be performed freely without any restrictions imposed by experience and practice in 
the past. The special examination committee has been established to fulfill this purpose.
Its organization was as follows [40]:
•	 General members who did not attend subcommittee meetings
– Chair: Isoroku Yamamoto, Vice Admiral, Administrative Vice Minister of the 
Navy
– Members: Rear Admiral Inoue, Director of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, the 
Ministry of the Navy and five other members
•	 First subcommittee for dealing with engine design and planning
– Members: Leader: Shipbuilding Vice Admiral Fukuma, Director of the Fifth 
Department (including the turbine group), the Technical Headquarters of the 
Navy; and nine other members
•	 Second subcommittee for dealing with the maximum engine power and suitable 
load/volume
– Members: Leader: Rear Admiral Mikawa, Director of the Second 
Department, the Naval General Staff; and eleven other members
•	 Third subcommittee for dealing with prior studies/experiments/systems and 
operations
– Members: Leader: Rear Admiral Iwamura, Director of the General Affairs 
Department, the Technical Headquarters of the Navy; and ten other members
18
 When Japan was defeated in 1945, most military organizations were ordered to burn 
 documents they had kept. Many documents of the Imperial Navy were burned before the 
General Headquarters of the U.S. Occupation Forces ordered the government to submit docu-
ments regarding the war. Ex-managers and ex-directors of the Imperial Japanese Navy then held 
meetings and decided to undertake a research project to collect, examine, and preserve technical 
documents to the extent possible. The Shibuya archives were the result of this project and came 
into the hands of Ryu¯taro- Shibuya. The description of the background of the Shibuya archives 
is based on Shibuya Bunko Cho-sa Iinkai, Shibuya Bunko Mokuroku (Catalogue of the Shibuya 
Archives), March 1995, Commentary.
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Ignoring duplication of members belonging to different subcommittees and arrang-
ing the net members by section, we obtain the following result (see Table 10.5).
The accident, as mentioned above, concerned the breakage of turbine blades. 
Tracing back the history of the development of the marine turbine in Japan since 
1918 when the Navy began to adopt geared turbines, we find that various failures 
occurred with main turbines. When we classify these failures during the period 
from 1918 to October 1944 by location, failures involving turbine blades account 
for 60 % of the total (see Table 10.6).19
The Imperial Japanese Navy had thus had many problems with turbine blades for 
many years and accumulated experience in handling them. Accordingly, it is unsur-
prising that the special examination committee took the accident as merely a rou-
tine problem from the outset based upon such a long and rich experience. In fact, the 
special examination committee drew a conclusion made up of two points, both of 
which were in line with such accumulated experience. First, the accident was caused 
by insufficient blade strength. Second, turbine rotor vibration made the insufficient 
strength emerge as a problem [41]. On the basis of this conclusion, a plan was worked 
out to improve the design of the blades and rotors of the Kanpon type turbines for 
all naval vessels. It was decided to change the form of the blades so as to make their 
stress concentration lower to enhance their strength [42]. The improvement of 61 
naval vessels’ turbines was indicated as the first step, in accordance with the volumi-
nous previous reports of 66 committee meetings held over a period of 10 months [43].
However, the blade breakage in the accident was significantly different from 
that in the past. In impulse turbines, for instance, blades in most cases were broken 
at the base where they were fixed to the turbine rotor. In contrast, one of the salient 
features of the Rinkicho- accident was that the tip of the blade was broken off. The 
broken off part amounted to one third of the total length of the blade.20 
Figure 10.2 is a photograph showing the locus of the breakage.
19
 This classification assumes that if a problem at one location produces another problem at 
another location, the latter problem is not counted separately, but is considered part of the former.
20
 The breakage as described in the record written at that time is as follows: “Moving blades 
and the rivets on the tip of the 2nd and 3rd stages of the intermediate-pressure turbines were bro-
ken…. The break in every moving blade was located at 40–70 mm from the tip” [42].
Table 10.5  Members of 
the special examination 
committee by section
Note Calculated based on [40]
Section Number
Administrative vice minister of the navy 1
Bureau of naval affairs 8
Naval general staff 5
Technical headquarters of the navy 15
Naval staff college 3
Naval engineering school 1
Total 33
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These facts indicated that the accident was significantly different from any pre-
vious routine problem. Yoshio Kubota, an Engineering Captain of the Navy who 
happened to be transferred to the Military Affairs Bureau in November 1938 when 
the special examination committee reported its conclusion, eventually noticed this 
point. It was not really permissible for a newcomer to the Military Affairs Bureau 
of the Navy to utter an objection to the latest conclusion of the special committee. 
In addition, six months before his transfer to the bureau, the Japanese government 
enacted the Wartime Mobilization Law on April 1, 1938 for the purpose of “con-
trolling and organizing human and material resources most efficiently… in case of 
war” (Clause 1). Naval vessels came first in the specification of the law as 
“resources for wholesale mobilization” (Clause 2). Against this background of 
wartime mobilization, a naval engine failure caused by small tip fragments of the 
main standard engine was a very delicate matter for anyone to raise.21 Despite the 
circumstances, Kubota strongly recommended that confirmation tests should be 
conducted again for naval vessels of the same type. He argued that if turbine rotor 
vibration was the true cause, then the failure would be repeatable when the engine 
was run continuously at the critical speed causing rotor vibration (nearly 6/10 to 
10/10 of the full speed).22
The Navy finally decided to initiate continuous-run tests equivalent to ten-
year runs on April 1, 1939. No failure occurred. This provided the Navy with the 
simplest practical rationale for cancelling the overall remedial measures for all 
naval vessels, which were expected to require huge amounts of extra money and 
21
 Reference [44, p. 412]. The author was in charge of drafting the national mobilization plan 
at the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikaku In) in the prewar period. For the Navy, war preparation 
updates started from August 1940. See [45, pp. 93–94]. Sugiyama was the Chief of the General 
Staff at that time.
22
 Records of an interview with Yoshio Kubota made by the Seisan Gijutsu Kyo-kai (Association 
for Production Technology) on March 19, 1955 [46].
Table 10.6  Turbine failures on naval vessels classified by location: 1918–1944
Source Based on [25, pp. 1–2]. Reaction blade means the blade of a traditional Parsons turbine 
(Cf., [25, p. 4].)
Location Incidents Percentage Cumulative
Impulse blade and grommet 368 46.8 46.8
Reaction blade and binding strip 111 14.1 60.9
Reduction gear and claw coupling 80 10.2 71.1
Bearing and thrust bearing 66 8.4 79.5
Casing 46 5.9 85.7
Casing partition and nozzle 34 4.3 89.7
Blade wheel and spindle 22 2.8 92.5
Steam packing 20 2.5 95.0
Others 39 5.0
Total 786 100.0 100.0
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Fig. 10.2  Broken part of a blade in the Rinkicho- accident (Source [42])
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time.23 An order was issued promptly to postpone the modification to the turbine 
blades and rotors of the Kanpon turbines for all naval vessels. At the same time, 
however, there was obviously an urgent need to consider the possibility of 
another cause and a study to identify the cause was restarted. The Maizuru Naval 
Dockyard conducted preliminary on-land tests and a more thorough one fol-
lowed at the Hiro Naval Dockyard to confirm the conditions that would make the 
failure recur. However, the test was extremely difficult to carry out. There were 
two reasons for this. First, the complete test required the Dockyard to construct 
from scratch a full-scale experimental apparatus for a load test of vibration, 
which was only completed in December 1941, the month the war with the U.S. 
and Britain broke out. Second, the test turned out to be so large-scale, eventually 
extending to more than 35 main items, that it took far more time than expected. 
As a result, the schedule for identifying the cause, which was originally expected 
to be completed in November 1940, was extended to mid-1943.24 Thus it is prob-
able that all of Japan’s naval vessels had turbines which were imperfect for some 
unknown reason when the country went to war with the U.S. and Britain in 1941.
What, then, was the true cause for the accident? The true cause was binodal 
vibration. Previous efforts to avoid turbine vibration had been confined to one-
node vibration at full speed since multiple-node vibration below full speed had 
been assumed to be hardly serious and unworthy of attention based on rule of 
thumb.25 The final discovery of the true cause of the Rinkicho- accident drastically 
changed the situation. It revealed that marine turbines are susceptible to a serious 
vibration problem below full speed. It was in April 1943 that this true cause was 
eventually identified by the final report of the special examination committee—
almost one and half years after war broke out (see Fig. 10.3).26
Only three months before the submission of the report, a theoretical study made 
at the Hiro Naval Dockyard supported the conclusion that the true cause was 
binodal vibration.27 The results of theoretical calculation, on-land confirmation 
testing, and the characteristics of the actual failure matched. The complete mecha-
nism creating binodal vibration itself was still left for further studies. Even so, 
23
 These original remedial measures are kept in the Shibuya archives.
24
 The descriptions here are based on [47]. This is the final report of the special examination 
committee.
25
 In general, such was the standard of turbine design in the prewar period [48–50].
26
 According to this report, “Binodal vibration occurs when the product of the number of noz-
zles and the revolution of blades … equals the frequency of the blades at binodal vibration [47].” 
This means that a forced vibration caused by steam pulsation and a specific binodal frequency of 
blades resonate with each other, as a result of which binodal vibration occurs.
27
 It proved that even if uniform vertical and horizontal sections were assumed for the purpose 
of simplification, binodal vibration could produce the maximum stress at places less than three-
fifths of the distance from the tip of a blade, which matched the place of the actual breakage in 
the failures [51]. Dr. Yasuo Takeda discovered this document on March 3, 1997, and it was added 
to the Shibuya archives.
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Fig. 10.3  The front page of 
the final report of the special 
examination committee 
(Source [47])
every result from the special examination committee that finally concluded in 
1943 pointed to the same single cause: binodal vibration [52].28
Strictly in terms of the technology involved in the accident without hindsight, 
therefore, all the evidence suggests that the Japanese government went to war in 
28
 Shigeru Mori, a contemporary Navy engineer who graduated from the Department of Physics 
of the Imperial University of Tokyo seems to have tried to construct a model to identify the 
mechanism, whose details are not available now See [53]. When we look at other circumstantial 
evidence such as the fact that the blade breakage was limited to a relatively small number of 
turbines of particular newly built destroyers, it was still plausible that the strength of particular 
blades had something to do with the failure. The Navy therefore revised its design directive to 
ensure an enormous increase (from 0.4 to 1.5 mm) in the thickness of turbine blades just after 
the submission of the final report of the committee in April 1943. The original design directive 
had been issued on May 1, 1931, the documents of which are collected in the Shibuya archives. 
In interpreting this circumstantial evidence, the author is indebted to Dr. Ryo-ichiro- Araki for 
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haste in 1941 notwithstanding the fact that it had unaccounted for, highly intricate, 
and serious problems with the main engines of all its naval vessels. And that fact 
was kept secret by the military sector from other sectors involved in the military-
industrial-university complex, not to speak of the general public. The rarity of 
breakdowns of naval vessels due to turbine troubles during the war is a completely 
different matter, one of hindsight. Thus, the Rinkicho- accident strongly suggests that 
practical results alone (for example, rarity of breakdowns of naval vessels due to 
turbine troubles) during wartime, possibly in peacetime as well, do not prove the 
essential soundness of the development trajectory of technology, and that of the sci-
ence-technology-society interface and national decision-making along the trajectory.
10.7  The Sociological Implications for the Fukushima 
Daiichi Accident: Beyond Success or Failure
The sociological implications of this Rinkicho- accident that happened much ear-
lier than the Fukushima Daiichi accident are closely related to the reasons why 
we can call it a little-known “structural disaster.” One of the reasons is that it was 
much more serious and complex than expected and therefore kept secret from out-
siders. This fact requires us to reconsider the development trajectory of technol-
ogy beyond the simplistic dichotomy of success or failure throughout peacetime 
and wartime. According to a standard view of the history of technology in general, 
Japan proceeded to a self-reliant phase with the establishment of the Kanpon type 
turbine in the 1920s, after improvements made to deal with various problems and 
failure incidents. In short, a successful self-reliant phase followed subsequent to 
improvements after various failures.
And it has been assumed up to now that this trajectory enabled Japan to go 
to war in 1941. According to the description and analysis of the Rinkicho- acci-
dent given above, however, the trajectory becomes much more complex than the 
conventional “success story” account suggests, since there was a serious but lit-
tle known missing phase, one of “self-reliant failure,” which the Navy was unable 
to completely solve by the outbreak of the war. Considering this in association 
with the similarity in terms of technological trajectory such that the reactors of the 
Fukushima Daiichi power station embody the turning point leading from licensed 
production to self-reliant production, there is the possibility that the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident was a “self-reliant failure” in the sense mentioned above.
Footnote (continued)
technical advice. Considering this circumstantial evidence together, there were possibly two 
closely associated aspects in the failure. One is a universal aspect leading to the detection of 
binodal vibration. The other is a more local aspect possibly due to the testing and quality control 
of the strength of the particular broken blades. Whatever weight may be given to each aspect in 
the description and analysis of the failure, however, as the date of the final report indicates, it was 
only after April 1943 that both aspects were finally noticed. By then, about one year and a half 
had already passed since the outbreak of the war with the U.S. and Britain in 1941.
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There is another reason why we can describe the Rinkicho- accident as a little-
known “structural disaster.” The reason is that the recognition of binodal turbine 
blade vibration as the true cause was beyond the knowledge of the usual turbine 
designer of the day. This type of problem is supposed to have been unrecognized 
until the postwar period. In the postwar period, avoiding turbine blade vibration 
caused by various resonances still provided one of the most critical topics for 
research on turbine design.29 The Imperial Japanese Navy certainly managed, after 
the serious technological and organizational errors of the Rinkicho- accident that 
was kept secret from outsiders, eventually to detect the universal true cause during 
the war. But its complete solution seems not to have been found after the detection 
of the true cause.30
In short, the problem was detected in the prewar period, but its final solution 
was left until after the war.31 Far beyond the simplistic dichotomy of success or 
failure throughout peacetime and wartime, this hidden and little known “structural 
disaster”, an important snapshot of a serious failure of Japan’s self-reliant prewar 
technology, gives a significant confirmation of the functional disintegration of the 
network of the relationships linking the military and industrial sectors. That is to 
say, the incident enables us to look at a secret military problem-finding and inves-
tigation, and pioneering but partial diagnosis without a well-informed industrial 
problem-solving process. This was the end state of the military-industrial-univer-
sity complex in the prewar period in which a pitfall was present within the success 
in technological development, from which the postwar industrial reconstruction in 
Japan started.
This will provide an important guideline for characterizing and understand-
ing the Fukushima Daiichi accident beyond the simplistic dichotomy of success 
or failure. This is because the kind of fresh account exemplified here, which goes 
29
 Cf., [54–59]. An article on the QE2’s turbine reported that a similar failure occurred even in 
1969. See [60].
30
 The same type of turbine blade breakage still occurred in the same class of destroyer more 
than one year after the final report of the special examination committee had been submitted. 
A destroyer of the same class was found to have had the same type of turbine blade breakage 
around “one-third of the blade from the tip” on July 21, 1944, an incident even less known than 
the Rinkicho- accident [25, pp. 158–159]. Also see [61].
31
 Postwar industrial development, and the development of the steam turbine for commercial 
purposes, among other things, started from a careful re-examination of the binodal vibration 
problem left unsolved by the prewar/wartime military sector. For example, in 1953 Kawasaki 
Heavy Industries Ltd. invited three technical advisers to help develop an independent turbine 
technology for the future: Yoshitada Amari (ex-Engineering Rear Admiral of the Navy), and 
Kanji Toshima and Sho-ichi Yasugi (both ex-Engineering Captains of the Navy). They were all in 
the Technical Headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Navy at some stage of their prewar careers 
and were also concerned with the Rinkicho- accident. And every detail of prewar turbine fail-
ures including the Rinkicho- accident was inputted into an IBM computer and reanalyzed, from 
which the company obtained an exact normal tolerance for the strength of turbine blades and 
a design to avoid binodal vibration. Based on [62] and a letter from Yasuo Takeda, Kawasaki 
Heavy Industries Ltd. to Kanji Toshima, IHI. (n.d.). For a detailed description and analysis of the 
Rinkicho- accident, see [24, pp. 159–172].
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beyond a dichotomous narration, has tended to be unduly neglected up to now in 
the sociology of science and technology and particularly in relation to the socio-
logical studies on extreme events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident. As 
a matter of fact, the Rinkicho- accident that occurred after a long history of suc-
cessful technological development reminds us of its structural similarity to the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident that happened after a long successful operation of 
nuclear reactors closely associated with the myth of safety.
Another sociological implication that could be obtained from this hidden accident 
pertains to the social context of organizational errors involved in “structural disaster.” 
As mentioned earlier, the social context of the Rinkicho- accident is the wartime 
mobilization of science and technology, which was authorized by the Wartime 
Mobilization Law in 1938 and the Research Mobilization Ordinance in the next year. 
This formal legal foundation gave rise to one of the salient features of the wartime 
mobilization of science and technology, namely the structural interdependence of the 
military-industrial-university complex under the control of the military sector. The 
military sector controlled the overall mobilization, in which the industrial sector and 
universities had to obey orders given by the military. This was associated with an 
extremely secretive attitude of the military toward outsiders. According to Hidetsugu 
Yagi who invented the pioneering Yagi antenna, a crucial component technology of 
radars, and in 1944 became the president of the Board of Technology, the central 
governmental authority specially set up for the wartime mobilization of science and 
technology, the military “treated civilian scientists as if they were foreigners.”32
Thus, even at the central governmental authority specially set up to integrate 
every effort for the wartime mobilization of science and technology, coopera-
tion, not to speak of coordination, with the military sector was very limited and 
the military-industrial-university complex began to lose its overall integration. 
Particularly in terms of the relationship between the military and industrial sectors, 
functional disintegration went further. What is important here is the fact that this 
functional disintegration of the network of relationships linking the military and 
industrial sectors was taking place just at the time the strong structural integration 
of the complex was formally being reinforced by the Wartime Mobilization Law 
and the Research Mobilization Ordinance.
And this coupling of structural integration and functional disintegration during 
wartime mobilization provides a suitable background for redefining success and fail-
ure not only in prewar Japan’s context but in the current context of the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident. The reason for this is that the social context of organizational errors 
involved in the Rinkicho- accident provides us with an important insight such that if 
the Fukushima Daiichi accident is a “structural disaster” it could have some char-
acteristics similar to the coupling of structural integration and functional disintegra-
tion. For example, functional disintegration of the network of relationships linking 
the government, TEPCO officials, and the relevant reactor designers of makers might 
32
 The statements by Yagi are based on [63]. These are Yagi’s words on September 11, 1945, 
when interrogated by General Headquarters of U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Scientific and 
Technical Advisory Section.
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be taking place just at the time the strong structural integration of the government-
industrial-university complex was formally reinforced by the seemingly well-organ-
ized ordinances and laws revolving around the “double-check” system within a 
single ministry in the past and that between two ministries now, between METI and 
the Ministry of the Environment, ministry-bounded in either case.
10.8  Conclusion: Prospects for the Future
From the perspective of “structural disaster”, there are two different kinds of similar-
ities between the Rinkicho- accident and the Fukushima Daiichi accident: one relating 
to technological trajectory, the other to the social context of organizational errors.
First, regarding similarity between the two accidents in terms of technological 
trajectory, both accidents took place in the stage of domestic or almost entirely 
domestic production of a technology once produced through license contracts 
after a successful operation of domestically produced technologies extending over 
10–30 years. In that particular sense, both accidents could be categorized in the 
“self-reliant failure” type.
Second, there could be similarity between the two accidents in terms of the 
social context of organizational errors. This is because the coupling of structural 
integration and functional disintegration observed in the Rinkicho- accident could 
similarly reside in the Fukushima Daiichi accident, particularly with respect to the 
relationships between the governmental and industrial sectors.
Of course, there are differences between the two accidents. Among other 
things, the difference in the way organizational errors came to be detected and 
corrected is noteworthy. In the Rinkicho- accident, the conclusion once submitted 
by the final report of the special examination committee and authorized by the 
organization in question was dynamically cancelled by carefully observed facts 
regardless of the rank in the organization of those who pointed out the facts and 
the past experience accumulated in the organization. Such a dynamic reconsidera-
tion of alternative possibilities that upset the face-saving procedure within a spe-
cific organization triggered the restart of the examination leading to a drastically 
different conclusion. In the Fukushima Daiichi accident, in contrast, up until now 
there has been no sign showing the working of this kind of dynamic correction 
of organizational errors. At least looking at inside stories of TEPCO, Nuclear and 
Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), and other governmental bodies that have been 
disclosed one after another, one might rather well suspect the working of mutual 
“cover-ups” within and/or between those organizations in question, though the 
possibility of the dynamic correction of organizational errors might still be left 
open. This difference is noteworthy because, even with the working of such a 
dynamic correction of organizational errors, reconsideration of alternative pos-
sibilities, and restarting of development, the timing of the realization of the true 
cause of the Rinkicho- accident was too late for Japan to check the soundness of 
national decision-making before going to war in haste in 1941.
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In sum, putting together the similarity between the Rinkicho- accident and the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident as “structural disaster” and their difference as to 
whether the dynamic correction of organizational errors and the reconsideration of 
alternative possibilities could work, there remains the possibility that the causes of 
“structural disaster” embedded in the Fukushima Daiichi accident will continue in 
a path-dependent manner. In such a case, the science-technology-society interface 
surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi accident will probably be unable to tolerate 
another impact that could be given by serious and unexpected events such as a sec-
ond huge earthquake and tsunami and/or the difficulty of decontamination within 
some of the reactors in question and their abrupt uncontrollability.
One of the most important lessons from understanding the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident as “structural disaster” based on scrutinizing the hidden one that hap-
pened much earlier is how to avoid the worst state of this kind. That is to say, the 
seemingly structurally robust but functionally disintegrated science-technology-
society interface due to secrecy should be changed. By the same token, while vari-
ous communication activities to facilitate links between science, technology, and 
society had been carried out with public funds as represented in café scientifique 
before the Fukushima Daiichi accident, it turns out that there had been only one 
café scientifique on anything nuclear (held on July 24, 2010) out of 253 carried 
out in the Tohoku district including Fukushima prefecture. And yet the topic taken 
up there had nothing to do with any kind of risk from nuclear power plants, not to 
speak of extreme events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident.33 This implies 
that various activities supposed to facilitate well-balanced links between science, 
technology, and society in reality did nothing in advance about the communication 
of the negative aspect of nuclear power plants and therefore played no role in early 
warning against extreme events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
As long as this kind of functional disintegration of the science-technology-society 
interface continues to exist and operate behind the façade of structural integration, 
such a state can lead to a similar dangerous weakness in quite a different and larger-
scale social context. The possibility of functional disintegration through structural 
interdependence accompanied with secrecy and the suppression of negative informa-
tion under the name of communication activities could constitute one of the impor-
tant symptoms of “structural disaster.” This state should be changed by the will of 
the people who are suffering from the Fukushima Daiichi accident for the purpose 
of instituting a significant structural remedy, the remedy which is far beyond counter 
measures that only temporarily patch over individual troubles coming into sight at 
the moment and serve to save face of responsible agents concerned.
33
 What is mentioned here is confirmed on November 18, 2011 through the following portal 
website on café scientifique in Japan: http://cafesci-portal.seesaa.net/.
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